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 Exchange requires equality, equality requires commensurability. How can we 
measure two qualitatively different things? This question is at the heart of political 
economy which purpose has been traditionally to explain the establishment of a price 
system where everything will be exchanged at its value. Only with such standard can we 
explain distribution: who gets what and why? As Ricardo explains in the Preface of 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxations: "To determine the laws which regulate this 
distribution [between rent, profit and wages] is the principal problem of political 
economy". And the determination of exchange value is the key to solve that problem. 
 I will argue that there are two main and distinct traditions that confronted this 
problem: the Aristotelician and the Ricardian traditions. After identifying the main 
characteristics of each, I will show how we passed from one to the other in the XVIIth-
XVIIIth century and why the Ricardian tradition brings us to a dead-end. We can identify 
the Aristotelician tradition with scholasticism and mercantilism while the Ricardian 
tradition rather identifies Classical political economy and Marx's critique of political 
economy. I will put in perspectives the different conceptions of justice and power that 
prevails in each traditions. 
 For Aristotle, [Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Chapter 5], the unit to measure all 
goods is, in truth, chreia (need/demand) "which holds all things together". And Money, 
by convention, has become a sort of representative of chreia "and this is why it has the 
name 'money' (nomisma) -  because it exists not by nature but by law (nomos)". As a 
measure, money makes goods commensurate and equates them; and "for neither would 
there have been association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not 
equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability". But Aristotle adds that, in 
truth: "it is impossible that things differing so much should become commensurate". In 
truth, a house cannot be equated with beds. Such an equalisation can only be something 
foreign to their real nature, but equalization through demand can be sufficient for the 
practical need of exchange. 
 For Marx [Kapital, Vol.1, Chapter 1, Section 3.A.3], Aristotle's analysis is a failure 
since he did not identify any concept of value, any "common substance, which admits of 
the value of the beds being expressed by a house". For Marx, such common substance 
does exist: "Compared with the beds, the house does represent something equal to 
them, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the beds and the house. And 
that is — human labour". But Marx excuses Aristotle for this failure since it was 
impossible for him to decipher that common substance:  
 
Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the 
inequality of men and of their labour-powers. The secret of the expression of value, 
namely, that all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, because, and so far as they are 
human labour in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has 
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already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a 
society in which the great mass of the produce of labour takes the form of commodities, 
in which, consequently, the dominant relation between man and man, is that of owners 
of commodities. The brilliancy of Aristotle's genius is shown by this alone, that he 
discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The 
peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering 
what, "in truth," was at the bottom of this equality.  
 
 
 Did value, human labour as a common substance of goods, always existed and 
was only awaiting the necessary social conditions to "reveal itself" in its true form? This 
question will underlie the rest of our presentation. 
 
 
The Aristotelician Tradition 
 
 Aristotle considers that exchange is possible through money, which is a 
convention (not a commodity). The equalization of goods is the product of the nomos, of 
a socio-historical institution. Money, product of the nomos, represents the chreia 
(need/demand), which holds all things (in the polis) together. Individuals and products 
are not commensurate, only the social law can equalize what is intrinsically different. We 
must keep in mind that Aristotle is not discussing an economic problem, he is rather 
discussing a political problem: what is the foundation of the polis. The nomos is not 
natural, it rather opposes the idea of nature (physis). The nomos is artificial and 
arbitrary, but, as Castoriadis explains [1978, p.355], it is not an arbitrary decision of 
some individuals; it is a universal arbitrariness, or rather, an arbitrary universality that 
founds the polis. Each city have a nomos, but different cities can thus have different 
arbitrary values (axia) embedded in the nomos; Aristotle shows that point by comparing 
and contrasting the Constitutions of the Greek cities. For Aristotle, the nomos of Athena 
must be based on the axia of virtue. Virtue then determines what is the chreia 
(need/demand) for all things. In his Politics, he even contrasts economics, the economic 
activity based on virtue, and chrematistics, the economic activity based on the unlimited 
desire to accumulate wealth, where accumulation become the final cause of human 
activity instead of being means for virtuous actions. 
 To put a long story short, let's just remember that the equalization of goods is 
done through a normative judgement. There is no possible exact calculation of prices, 
but the social need/demand is expressed sufficiently well by money for practical 
purposes. As for the axia of the nomos of the polis, it will later be replaced by the Will of 
God in scholastic thought. This normative judgement is at the heart of the conception of 
the "Just price" debated in medieval economic thought until the XVIIth century.  
 
The Scholastic conception of trade 
 Scholasticism refers to a medieval set of systematic doctrines which merged 
Aristotle's thinking and Christianity. It goes from the Xth century to the XVIIth century. 
Thomas Aquinas, who renovated scholasticism by integrating new elements of Aristotle's 
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thought rediscovered during the Renaissance, is usually considered as the most 
important Scholastic. For Scholastic thinkers, prices are not natural; they are rather the 
results of a bargain between two parties. It is the product of a relation of power. The 
main question for Scholastic thinkers is thus what would be the just price in a particular 
transaction so nobody exploit the other's needy situation? Scholastic thought is not 
monolithic since it evolves considerably from Pierre Lombard (XIth Century), to Thomas 
Aquinas (XIIIth Century) to the School of Salamanca1 (XVI-XVIIth Centuries). No need to 
say, the economic conditions were far different than what they are nowadays: the 
economic transactions are done on a local marketplace, usually with no real alternative 
buyer or seller and monopolies or collusion between merchants to raise prices are 
frequent. Also, some common features of the scholastic economic thought must be kept 
in mind: 
· Exchange is a personal relation between two individuals. There is no anonymity 
between the parties. 
· Exchange is usually considered as a confrontation between two unequal parties, 
where one always tries to coerce the other. Price is the product of power relations 
and justice must ensure that no one abuses his position of strength. 
· The just price concerns only the necessaries of life. There is no moral judgement 
necessary over the price of luxury goods since such trade cannot exploit the poor 
situation of an individual. 
· Usury is forbidden since it is an exploitation of individual economic need. Other 
arguments will also be used against usury [Langholm, 19998, p.63]: 1-Argument 
from the sale of time (which belongs to God) 2-Argument from ownership 
(ownership of money borrowed passes to the borrower and any profit obtained 
with it belongs to him) 3-Argument from consumptibility (money has no use 
value) 4-Argument from the sterility of money (metal cannot breed). 
· The just price is not a unique price; it is rather a price bracket in which the 
market price may vary somewhat without violating the requirement of justice.  
· The concept of property is not clearly defined. The idea of absolute domination 
over our own possession, idea that came from the Roman Law and that will be 
essential in post-scholastic thought, will appear only at the end of the XVIth 
Century. 
· The "real price" does not exist. The price always expresses an exchange relation 
with money. Price and money are inseparable. 
· Money finds its meaning in the act of measurement which brings three 
consequences [Tortajada, 1992, pp.76-79]: 1-Invariability of money must be 
defended against manipulation and mutation 2-Trading moneys (exchange rate) 
made no sense since the trade of a measure for another was absurd 3-Since 
Money measures commodities, a theory of value is not necessary. 
                                            
1 The expression "School of Salamanca" first appeared in José Larraz, La época del mercantilismo en 
Espana (1500-1700), Madrid: Atlas, 1943. It designates the Dominicans who taught at the University 
of Salamanca (Spain) and contributed to make thomism the foundation of moral theology. The School 
of Salamanca was in some way very progressive; it integrated the social role of the merchants in 
traditional considerations, it formulated a conception of monetary interest morally acceptable and it 
first considered the market price as a form of the just price. 
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 What was at stake in scholastic economic thought was not economic efficiency but 
rather economic justice. Every economic transaction was considered in its singularity to 
determine its moral validity: was there collusion or monopoly? Was one of parties 
submitted to economic compulsion? In fact, a catchword of the literature was caristia 
indicatur (inducing dearth) [Langholm, 1998, p.90]: is the eagerness for personal profit 
harmful for the community in that particular transaction? Scholastic economic thought 
was first and foremost a discussion over the existence of compulsion in economic 
transactions. This compulsion might be done against the buyer or the seller but in 
general, the seller is the most powerful party since the merchant that controls the 
resources normally need money less than his customers will need his goods. In fact, the 
main economic problem at the time was strategic transactions by merchants to starve 
people so to raise prices and profits. The capital of a merchant wasn't made of "means of 
production", it was his monopoly power, his capacity not to create wealth, but to create 
scarcity. In the end, for scholastic thinkers, what distinguished between compulsion and 
a reasonable balance of economic interests respecting the just price was first and 
foremost a matter of judgement. Judgement was what scholastic economic ethics usually 
fell back upon.  
 But Scholasticism evolved with its time. The Reform made personal gains for 
merchants a matter of personal consciousness; theories of natural rights analysed social 
relations without referring to theology; the rise of wage-labour brought in economic 
transactions over a particular commodity: labour-power. Those elements forced the 
development of new ideas in scholastic thought. For example, the development of wage-
relations conducted to the development of a large literature over the needy labourer 
confronting the rich capitalist, forced to sell his services2 [Langholm, 1998, pp. 118-136]. 
Also, Juan de Lugo, maybe the most important economic thinker of Salamanca, published 
his work De iusticia et iure in 1642, the very same year that the most anti-Aristotelician 
thinker of the XVIIth century, Thomas Hobbes, published De Cive. While the scholastic 
tradition always identifies justice with the purpose of actions, Lugo articulates a novel 
idea that first found its expression in natural law: justice pertains to the keeping of 
covenants, not to their terms. Such reconsideration over the meaning of justice brought 
the decomposition of the scholastic paradigm. Note that this paradigm, secularized, will 
revive with the old insitutionnalist school, especially with John Roger Commons 
[Langholm, 1998, pp.178-200]. 
 
 
THE RICARDIAN TRADITION 
 
 The Ricardian tradition of exchange value measurement appeared in the XVIIIth 
century with Adam Smith. By identifying the different natural economic laws, exchange 
value is now measured first and foremost by a quantum of human labour. Before getting 
into the thought of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx, we must first identify 
                                            
2 The figure of the needy laborer disappear in the XVIIIth century but it reappears in ideological 
disputes in the XIXth century, not as a person but as a class. If Marx never thought of the exploitation 
of labour in Aristotelician terms, he did consider need as a form of compulsion (the free worker on the 
free market, owning nothing but himself and forced to sell his labour-power to survive). 
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some important social settings of the XVIIIth Century that differs dramatically from the 
ones in the scholastic tradition: 
 
· Growth of the market; development of the networks of international trade. 
· Rise of market societies with enclosures and industrial revolutions, alternatives to 
wage-labour sometimes impossible. 
· Men are considered equal. 
· Depersonalization of exchange. Objectivization of market relations, exchange 
becomes an anonymous transaction. 
· Ownership clearly defined as absolute domination over our possessions. 
· Institutionalization of monopolies for trade with the colonies 
 
 
 The depersonalization of exchange is fundamental since the objectivization of 
market relations allows one to discover "economic laws" independent of personal 
relations. Nature becomes the key word: social relations are determined by nature and 
we can thus identify natural laws of economic behaviour. Individuals, acting according to 
natural economic laws, evade personal, subjective moral responsibility for their economic 
actions (for their use of economic power). More than anything else, this objectivization of 
markets signals the breakdown of the scholastic approach to economic ethics. 
 
 
Adam Smith; at the crossroads of scholasticism and classical political economy 
 
 Adam Smith is usually considered as the first classical political economist, but he 
is also the last of the Scholastics [Lapidus, 1986, pp. 55-66]. Smith's political economy is 
grounded in moral philosophy. Smith achieves to dissociate a criterion of optimality for 
the economy (the determination of natural prices) from a mechanism that determines 
market prices. Smith shows how competition, or natural liberty in transactions, will fix 
prices that correspond more or less the to "natural prices" of commodities. The natural 
prices correspond to what morals dictate, they are the just prices, but they are now also 
the optimal prices for the greatest growth of the wealth of the nation. And market prices, 
through competition, will in the end "gravitate" around the natural prices.  
 
- The market as a solution to the genealogy of morality 
 In the XVIIIth century, luxury consumption was still considered immoral. When 
Mandeville, in 1714, wrote the Fable of the Bees, he prefigured economic liberalism by 
defending that private vices make public virtues. This book came as a real shock at the 
time since it was first and foremost an apology of luxury. Sumptuary consumption by rich 
people creates a demand for labour, which provides a wage for poor people. The private 
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vices of the rich guarantee the survival of all. But luxury keeps its immoral connotation in 
Mandeville's writings. Adam Smith will be the first to make the desire for unlimited 
wealth (avidity) not only socially beneficent but also morally acceptable. 
 In the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS, 17593), Smith tackles the problem of the 
genealogy of morality: can moral judgement be the source of general rules of justice? 
For moral judgement to be so, it has to be 1-immediate (shaped by our sensations), 2-
general (shared by everyone) and 3-compulsory. This approach is typical of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Before him, Hume considered that moral judgement, shaped by 
sensations, was unable to determine the rules of justice. Hume considered that justice 
couldn't be deduced through reason (reason is the slave of passions), or couldn't be 
induced by sentiments as argued Hutcheson since sympathy was necessarily partial. It 
was thus impossible to identify natural laws and thus justice couldn't be natural; it has to 
be artificial. For Hume, justice was a necessary artifice, an artificial virtue, a convention. 
Smith agrees with the critique of Hume but refuses to consider justice to be 
conventional.  
 Smith tackles at showing that moral judgement can become a general rule of 
justice through the mechanism of the "impartial spectator". Through sympathy, one can 
project himself in the mind of somebody else so to feel his emotions (classical sympathy 
of the Scottish XVIIIth century), but Smith considers that one can also project himself in 
the mind of somebody that would be looking at him and judging his actions. Therefore, 
for any misconduct done even in the greatest secret, one would still feel blameworthy. 
But to project ourselves in the mind of an impartial spectator judging our actions is a 
complex enterprise. One must follow a set of rules (prescribed in the TMS) and only 
philosophers can become such impartial spectators. But what about the rest of the 
people? How can we generalize the impartial moral judgement since almost all the people 
will never be philosophers? The moral judgement is immediate, general (anyone who 
reaches the level of the impartial spectator will arrive at the same conclusion) but it is 
not compulsory since almost no-one will reach the level of the impartial spectator. For 
Smith, the problem is then to explain how individuals that are not acting toward the 
common good (was it only because they don't know what it is) can nevertheless coexist 
and form a society. In other words, does the common good suppose the virtue of all or 
can the generalization of the moral judgement be attained even if people do not act 
virtuously? Smith's answer will be that, in the domain of the economy, under certain 
conditions, the free competitive market can act as such mechanism that will force people 
to act virtuously even if they don't intend to, or even if they don't even know what is the 
common good. For all non-philosophers, the market must replace the impartial spectator. 
Everyone looking for his own private interests will achieve the greatest public good. 
 The impartial spectator is able to determine the natural prices of commodities, 
prices that are just and that will maintain a dynamic process that ensures the greatest 
wealth of the nation. But those prices cannot be imposed in the economy and Smith 
shows how the free competitive markets can make in sort that free competitive market 
prices will always tend to natural prices, they will always "gravitate" around the natural 
prices [WON, Book 1, chap.7].  
                                            
3 The TMS was first published in 1759 but it was re-edited with revisions and augmentations in 1761, 
1767, 1774 and 1781. The interpretation according to which the TMS was only an early work on 
morality incompatible with the focus on selfishness in the Wealth Of Nations (Das Adam Smith 
Problem) is not acceptable. It is more accurate to consider both works as two parallel and 
complementary reflections.  
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 Our interpretation is that the natural price in Adam Smith is the just price for 
Scholastics, but now, it is also the optimal price price to increase the wealth of the 
nation. The difference is that Smith dissociates the just price from the mechanism for the 
determination of prices: the market. The just price needs not to be imposed according to 
the particular conditions of the trade, it can be obtained through natural liberty and 
anonymity. But Smith now needs to explain how the market can determine prices that 
correspond to natural prices while economic agents still hold economic power; he needs 
to defuse power in economic transactions. For this to happen, Smith must tackle at what 
Hume called "the passion destroying all societies" (because it doesn't have any 
opposite): the desire for unlimited wealth (avidity).  
  
- Defusing avidity and power; the moral construction of capital 
 Main vice of all societies conducing to the worst inequalities, avidity must be 
defused. To do so, Smith puts forth his concept of capital with which he transforms the 
vice into virtue. Enrichment is not dilapidating morality anymore, at the contrary, it is 
now the result of a virtue: saving, the sacrifice of non-consumption. Those who 
accumulate capital do not accumulate to buy luxury goods (as in Mandeville), they 
accumulate means to put wage-labourers to work so they produce more wealth that will 
be used to put more wage-labourers to work, etc. They accumulate for the sake of 
accumulation, irrationally. Does it mean that a poor man's son who starts saving to 
accumulate wealth so to get out of poverty would be irrational? This is exactly what 
Smith is defending when he says that such a man, by the end of his life [TMS, 1759, 
pp.182-183]:  
In the languor of disease and the weariness of old age, the pleasures of the vain and 
empty distinctions of greatness disappear […] Power and riches appear then to be, what 
they are, enormous and operose machines […] If we consider the real satisfaction which 
all these things are capable of affording […], it will always appear in the highest degree 
contemptible and trifling. 
 
 This quest, insatiable and useless, it is the accumulation of capital and it is done 
by people victim of an illusion. But this illusion is fortunate [TMS, 1759, p.183]: 
 It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. 
It is this which first prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found 
cities and commonwealths, and to invent and improve all the sciences and arts, which 
ennoble and embellish human life; which have entirely changed the whole face of the 
globe. 
 
 Accumulation of wealth thus depends on savings. Unlimited enrichment is 
compatible with the common good, as long as it takes the form of capital accumulation, 
capital being here a fund of necessaries of life to pay wage-labourers. The capacity for 
enrichment, the earning-capacity must then correspond proportionately to the 
production-capacity. Capital is thus means of production, means to put people to work 
and its value corresponds exactly to its productivity. Accumulation thus ensures the 
greatest well being for all. We are here at the heart of the ideological war machine of 
economic liberalism. Two centuries later, Hayek defends exactly the same conception 
when he says [1988, p.138]:  
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"When the market indicates to an individual entrepreneur that he can gain more profits 
by acting in such a way, it gives him the possibility of acting according to his own 
interests but also to provide the community with a greater contribution than any he could 
provide in any other way" 
 
 The strength of Smith's and Hayek's argument is that the earning-capacity, 
formerly considered as being determined by power over others, is now conceptualized in 
terms of the power to produce goods that will benefit all. My earning-capacity (returns on 
capital) is determined by my productive capacity, by my productivity, by my contribution 
to enlarge the wage-fund, thus by my contribution to the welfare of all, to the common 
good. My personal enrichment is necessarily done by a contribution to the welfare of all. 
The level of chrematistics in Aristotle becomes here the rate of growth of the economy. 
Capital, formerly power over others, becomes simply power over nature, viz a power to 
produce, means of production, a capacity to extract commodities from nature. But in 
concrete terms, for Smith, capital is a fund of necessaries of life, a fund of real wealth 
that allows one to command the labour of others. From this follows his definition of real 
wealth that we find in the Wealth of Nations (WON) where Smith cites Hobbes: 
Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to 
a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either 
civil or military. […] The power which that possession immediately and directly conveys 
to him, is the power of purchasing; a certain command over all the labour, or over all the 
produce of labour, which is then in the market.  
 
 But Smith cites Hobbes wrongly. Hobbes rather said [1652, chap. X, p.58]: 
"Riches joined with liberality is power; because it procureth friends and servants". In 
fact, for Hobbes, it is reputation of prodigality that procures power. Smith puts in 
Hobbes' mouth the opposite meaning since he tries to reduce any form of economic 
power to a simple purchasing power, to the action of trade itself. But, one could argue, 
isn't purchasing power, namely the power to command other's labour, the power par 
excellence over others? Yes and no. It is a power over others but this power is defused 
since the competitive free market makes sure that goods are exchanged for goods of 
equal value. Wealth, as purchasing power, is necessarily exchanged for a power of equal 
magnitude and two equal powers, by definition, cancel each other. The economic sphere, 
for Smith, is thus the realm of only one type of power: capital in terms of a productive 
power over nature. Smith knows that other economic powers are at work (privileges and 
monopolies) but this is the reason why he constructs his "system of natural liberty" 
against the "mercantile system"4. He aims at showing how the destruction of market 
powers and privileges, namely the destruction of the power of the merchants, will serve 
the general interest.  
 The key analytical concept in Smith is thus his concept of capital. His moral 
construction of capital allows: 
1- to defuse the vice destroying all societies (avidity) 
                                            
4 The WON is constructed as an opposition between the existing "mercantile system" which is sub-
optimal and the "system of natural liberty" which can provide the greatest wealth for nations. 
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2- to conceptualize the economy not anymore in terms of a game of power over others 
(zero-sum game) but rather in terms of a game of power over nature (positive sum 
game), in terms of productive capacity. 
3- to solve the problem of the genealogy of morality since the market can tend to natural 
prices only if bargaining powers are evacuated from the economic transactions. 
4- to attack directly the mercantile system as a system going against the common good. 
5-To found political economy as a discipline by showing that freedom of trade is 
necessarily conducive to the greatest welfare for all (self-regulating market). 
 
 With his concept of capital, Smith poses the foundations of classical political 
economy thanks to a particular conception of justice and power. We thus have a complex 
theoretical construction where freedom of trade ensures justice and progress because the 
earning-capacity of capital is determined by its social productivity. 
 
- The Smithian measure of value 
 After considering the moral construction of Smith's economics, we can now turn to 
Smith's considerations about the measure of value. In WON, Smith distinguishes 
between use value (the utility of an object) and exchange value (its purchasing power). 
Political economy being interested in relative values, it must focus on exchange value 
(utility thus not being a standard of value). To explain exchange value, Smith 
distinguishes between the nominal and the real price of commodities, nominal price being 
the price in terms of money while the real price is the price in terms of labour: "The real 
price of everything, what everything really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is 
the toil and trouble of acquiring" [p.26]. Wealth is thus a power of acquiring 
commodities, a purchasing power: "The exchangeable value of everything must always 
be precisely equal to the extent of this power which it conveys to its owner" [p.26]. This 
power cannot be measured through nominal prices since the value of money can vary 
(money is only a veil that hides the real economy). After also disqualifying corn as a 
universal standard of value, Smith considers that labour is the real measure of 
exchangeable value of all commodities:  
" Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places may be said to be of equal value to 
the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits; in the ordinary degree 
of skill and dexterity5, he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty 
and his happiness" [p.28] 
 
 Therefore, "Labour alone […] never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate 
and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be 
estimated and compared"[p.28]. But Smith considers that wealth is a purchasing power, 
not a substance. So the labour that measures the value is not the one embodied in the 
commodity but the one that the commodity can command through exchange: "[The 
                                            
5 Note that Smith considers here labor to be abstract and not concrete since it depends on ordinary 
conditions. Ricardo also considers labor to be abstract. 
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value of wealth] is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable [its 
possessor] to purchase [p.26]. 
 Then, Smith seems to transform totally his approach when he distinguishes 
between natural prices and market prices. Smith considers that in the "early and rude 
state of society" [p.41], the proportion between the quantities of labour necessary for 
acquiring different objects was seemingly the only circumstance to determine the 
proportion for exchanging commodities. But, "in the advanced state of society" [p.42], 
with the accumulation of stock and the property of land, profit and rent appeared, so "the 
whole produce of labour does not always belong to the labourer" [p.43]. Rent and profits 
are added (according to a natural rate) to the real price determined by labour. In the 
advanced state of society, the natural price of commodities is thus determined not only 
by labour but also by the added value of profit and rent: 
"When the price of a commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay 
the rent of the land, the wages of labour, and the profits of the stock employed in 
raising, preparing, and bringing it to the market, according to their natural rates, the 
commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural price" [p.48]. 
 
 The natural price is not in contradiction with the real price since, for Smith, labour 
is not a substance embodied in the commodity but only a standard of measure; the 
standard is commanded labour, not embodied labour. If, to command labour, a rate of 
profit and a rent must naturally be paid, then it is also part of the natural price. Smith 
ends his discussion on prices by considering that the actual price (market price) is 
sometimes above or below the natural price due to variations in demand and supply. But 
the market always tends to adjust itself through competition so the natural price is the 
central price to which "the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating" [p.51]. 
The addition of wage, profit and rent in a competitive market economy thus provides a 
way to determine the value of any commodity.  
 
David Ricardo and the formalization of classical political economy 
 David Ricardo is well known for what Josef Schumpeter called the "Ricardian vice". 
Ricardo conceptualizes the economy in terms of a model with a set of hypothesis. 
Everything is reduced to a set of assumptions from which we build a whole model. If 
Smith provides the moral construction of political economy, Ricardo transforms this 
construction into a set of assumptions given before the analysis. The Smithian moral 
construction is simply naturalized. The natural price, or value, is defined as the difficulty 
of production [Principles, chap. 20]. Value and capital are then determined in the relation 
of man with nature, they are determined by the difficulty to extract commodities from 
nature. Smith's conclusions become here only basic assumptions. But Ricardo doesn't 
agree with all that Smith defends, his main objection concerns the measure of value. 
 For David Ricardo, Smith's explanation of value is shaky since the power to 
command labour can vary with nominal wages (this point will provide long debates with 
Malthus). In his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Ricardo intends to rectify 
Smith's analysis at the very start; the subtitle of the first chapter being: "The value of a 
commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends 
on the relative quantity of labor which is necessary for its production, and not on the 
greater or less compensation which is paid for that labor" [p.17].  
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  For Ricardo, the problem with Smith's analysis is that the standard of value is 
dependant upon distribution (the value of commodities will change if there is a variation 
in wages or in the rate of profit). We must keep in mind that Ricardo's project was first 
and foremost to explain distribution since for him the principal problem in political 
economy is to determine the laws of distribution between wage, profit and rent [Preface 
of his Principles]. Therefore, the standard of value is of no use in explaining this 
distribution if it depends upon it. For Ricardo, the value of a thing is not based on its 
"power to command labor" but rather on the difficulty to produce it. Instead of 
commanded labor, Ricardo considers that the real standard of value should be embodied 
labor in the commodity. The difference is important in relation to Smith. For example, if 
we consider that in the "early and rude state of society", in ordinary conditions, a man 
hunts three beavers in nine hours (an entire working day), the value of a beaver in terms 
of embodied labour is simple: three hours of work, that is the third of a day; its value in 
terms of commanded labour is exactly the same since a beaver can command three 
hours of work. In the rude and early state, the two evaluations coincide. But what 
happens when we consider the "advanced state of society", where the owner of capital 
used in the hunting withholds a profit and the owner of the land on which the hunting is 
done withholds a rent. The product of labor is now divided between the hunter, the 
capitalist and the landlord. If we consider that they each receive one beaver, the value of 
a beaver in terms of embodied labour stay the same (three hours for one beaver) while 
its value in terms of commanded labor is different, it is now one day of work for one 
beaver since to get one beaver, the worker is ready to work an entire day (not the third 
of a day), so one beaver commands nine hours of work.  
 The conclusion of Ricardo is therefore that if we want our standard of value to be 
independent relatively to distribution: "It is the comparative quantity of commodities 
which labor will produce that determines their present or past relative value, and not the 
comparative quantities of commodities which are given to the labourer in exchange for 
his labor" [p.21]. For Ricardo, labor is not just a measure of value, it is its substance. 
Embodied labor thus determines value, which determines prices. Ricardo agrees with 
Smith on the difference between natural prices (corresponding to the exact amount of 
embodied labor) and market prices (which gravitates around natural prices). 
  
Karl Marx; Critic and prisoner of classical political economy 
 Smith and Ricardo thus provide two different articulations of the concepts of 
labour, value and prices. In his Théories sur la Plus-value, Marx will criticize both 
conceptions. He considers that Smith emphasizes too much on "living labour" (the labour 
one can put to work) where commanded labor is just a measure and thus must 
presuppose the substance that has to be measured. As for Ricardo, Marx considers that 
he emphasizes too much on dead labour since he does not distinguish between labour 
and labour power (and thus Ricardo discusses the "price of labour", which does not make 
sense to Marx). Also, by distinguishing between labour as the substance of value and 
labour power as the commodity that produces labour, Marx is able to bring in the concept 
of exploitation at the core of his political economy. While everything is exchanged at its 
value in the sphere of circulation, exploitation is at the centre of the economy since it is 
at the centre of the sphere of production: production in the capitalist process is possible 
only if a surplus-value is extracted. 
 In Marx's analysis, the economy is divided in two domains: circulation 
(phenomenons on the surface) and production (the secret laboratory of the capitalist). 
For Marx, there is no power involved in the games of the trade, exactly as in Smith 
[Kapital, Book 1, Part II, chap.6] : 
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This sphere [of circulation] within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-
power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule 
Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. […] Each looks to himself only, and no one 
troubles himself about the rest, and just because they do so, do they all, in accordance 
with the pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an all-shrewd 
providence, work together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the 
interest of all. 
 
 Marx shows that the capitalist will exert his domination over the worker while 
totally respecting the laws of trade under perfect competition. The free worker on the 
free market is forced to sell his labour-power at its value (the cost of its reproduction), 
he works for the capitalist who appropriates the product of his labour. The value of all 
commodities is determined by the socially necessary labour-time. The extraction of a 
surplus-value is done without coercion from the parties of the trade. Nevertheless, by 
showing the existence of an overall exploitation even without direct coercion, Marx 
reintroduces power relations at the core of his economic analysis. In the 
Smithian/Ricardian ideal economic construction where power is totally evacuated, where 
everything is exchanged at its value (natural price), there is still a macro-power relation 
involved. This time the power relation is not between two individuals but between two 
classes: capitalists and workers. There is no compulsion involved in trade but there is still 
exploitation at the heart of the whole economic process of production. 
 But what is at first a critique of the economy as such, a critique of the way men 
relate to each other through commodities identified as cristallised human labour, it 
becomes rapidly a critique of political economy (that is bourgeois economics) as a 
mystified and ideological representation of economic reality. But Marx also constructs his 
own economic theory, a true theory to oppose to false bourgeois economics. 
 Marx's analysis is very rich but there is a major analytical problem in his 
reconstruction of economics: his whole economic analysis, the determination of value, is 
still grounded on the notion of social productivity (socially necessary labour-time). Marx 
shows the domination of a class over the other but his economic theory is still grounded 
on the notion that social productivity determines value. Capital, as a way to exploit 
workers, as an earning-capacity, still remains means of production, a power over nature 
to produce commodities. The difference with Smith and Ricardo is that Marx's capital is 
not only means of production, it involves also a social relation where the capitalist must 
used the means of production to exploit the worker. But still, the value of capital is 
determined by its productivity over nature. Marx's concept of capital differs from Smith's 
and Ricardo's but it is still grounded in the same moral construction in terms of 
productivity. Marx, Ricardo and Smith (but also neoclassical economics) analyze value 
through the same paradigm that can be divided in two propositions: 
1-The value of capital corresponds to its earning-capacity. 
2-This earning-capacity is determined by productivity. 
   
 For sure, it is the second proposition that founds the whole normative judgement 
in the economic analysis. Marx is prisoner of such normative judgement since the 
accumulation of capital is necessarily the development of productive forces. Marx 
remains in this moral conception of capital where any earning-capacity is proportional to 
its productive capacity. In fact, Marx remains in an approach in terms of natural prices to 
construct his whole economic analysis. But in some passages he considers that value of 
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commodities is determined by a social validation of private labour (and not by the 
difficulty of production being the socially necessary labour-time). We will here show that 
both approaches are incompatible. 
 
- Abstract labour as the substance of value; analysis in terms of natural prices 
 This approach in terms of natural prices considers that the magnitude of value 
must be determined by an intrinsic substance. This substance, for Marx, is abstract 
labour; value is the quantity of direct and indirect labour spent during the production of 
the commodity, the quantity of socially/technically necessary labour. The value 
determined is an intrinsic magnitude, it is the natural price of the commodity. Value is 
thus "frozen abstract labour" embodied in the commodities during production; the 
determination of the magnitude of value is done through the production process. Value is 
the natural price of the commodity around which will market prices gravitate. To this 
approach is often associated the figure of the "old" Marx since the three volumes of 
Capital emphasize mostly (but not only) this reasoning. With this approach, all economic 
laws can be understood in real terms: money has no role; it is just a commodity as every 
other. The channels of circulation cannot overflow, there can be no inflation since, for 
Marx, a regulation of the quantity of money will be made through hoarding.  
 Using this approach, Marx can easily construct an objective concept of exploitation 
during capitalist production since the labour-power commodity needs less value to be 
produced than it can produce. To the surplus value extracted from labour-power will 
correspond the profit of the capitalist. But there is here a problem due to a necessary 
requirement of a capitalist economy: there must be a uniform rate of profit in the 
economy because of the competition among capitalists. The problem is that the organic 
composition of capital is different between branches of production. Then if profits 
correspond to surplus-value, and if the amount of surplus-value produced in different 
branches varies according to the organic composition of capital, the rate of profit should 
then be different in every branch. For Marx, the uniformity of the rate of profit in every 
branch must be respected since it is a necessary requirement in a capitalist economy. 
The only solution is then to consider that prices do not correspond directly to values and 
that the rate of exploitation in each branch does not correspond directly to the rate of 
profit. Marx thus considers that value explains the origin of prices and profits but that 
prices and profits are determined not according to value but to the amount of money 
invested by the capitalist in the process of production. Marx is thus stuck with the 
problem of transforming values in prices so to respect the uniform rate of profit between 
branches [Capital, Vol. 3]. The problem of the transformation was the Achille's heel in 
Marx's analysis in terms of natural prices. To synthesize briefly long debates in the 
marxist tradition, let's just say that Marx never provided a satisfactory solution to the 
problem of transformation and those after who tried, like Bortkiewicv, Dmitriev and 
Sraffa, arrived to the conclusion that a correct scheme of transformation in fact proved 
that values were not necessary to determine prices. Therefore, natural prices are not 
necessary to provide a price system. The debates went on in the marxist tradition as for 
the way in which value could be relevant for economic analysis. 
 Nevertheless, if we put aside the problem of transformation, this approach in 
terms of natural prices allows us to identify the tendency of the falling rate of profit, 
which shows "scientifically" that capitalism will destroy itself6.  
                                            
6 Through technological competition between capitalists, the proportion of constant capital is 
increasing relatively to variable capital. To produce, capitalists have to buy more constant capital 
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-Problems in defining abstract labour as the substance of value 
 However, beside the problem of "transformation", a lot of problems arise from this 
approach. The main problem being grounding the concept of abstract labour as the 
substance of value on proper theoretical foundations. In fact, Marx only identifies 
negatively labour as the substance of value without any positive demonstration: he 
eliminates all the external contingent characters of use-value until he finds only one 
substance that is common to every commodity, that is labour. Labour, abstracted from 
the real-concrete use-values, becomes the magnitude of value in exchange. But any 
process of elimination cannot be grounded theoretically: how can we know that there is 
not another common substance that we don't know yet about? But also, as Böhm-Bawerk 
and Wicksteed point out, any use-value has to be useful, so why isn't it "utility" that is 
the common substance of commodities? Note that we find in Hegel exactly the same 
process of extraction of a common substance between the different contingent use-
values. But for Hegel [Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §63], that common substance 
is utility since Value is linked with need-in-general: 
A thing in use is a single thing determined quantitatively and qualitatively and related to 
a specific need. But its specific utility, being quantitatively determinate, is at the same 
time comparable with [the specific utility of] other things of like utility. Similarly, the 
specific need which it satisfies is at the same time need in general and thus is 
comparable on its particular side with other needs, while the thing in virtue of the same 
considerations is comparable with things meeting other needs. This, the thing's 
universality, whose simple determinate character arises from the particularity of the 
thing, so that it is eo ipso abstracted from the thing's specific quality, is the thing's value, 
wherein its genuine substantiality becomes determinate and an object of consciousness. 
As full owner of the thing, I am eo ipso owner of its value as well as of its use.[…] 
The qualitative disappears here in the form of the quantitative; that is to say, when I 
speak of 'need', I use a term under which the most various things may be brought; they 
share it in common and so become commensurable. The advance of thought here 
therefore is from a thing's specific quality to a character which is indifferent to quality, 
i.e. quantity. […] In property, the quantitative character which emerges from the 
qualitative is value. Here the qualitative provides the quantity with its quantum and in 
consequence is as much preserved in the quantity as superseded by it. […] The value of 
a thing may be very heterogeneous; it depends on need. But if you want to express the 
'value of a thing not in a specific case but in the abstract, then it is money which 
expresses this. Money represents any and every thing, though since it does not portray 
the need itself but is only a symbol of it, it is itself controlled by the specific value [of the 
commodity]. Money, as an abstraction, merely expresses this value.  
 
 Marx builds on Hegel but integrates Ricardo by choosing labour to be the common 
substance of commodities instead of utility. But labour must be homogenized (concrete 
and abstract labour; skilled and unskilled labour), and it conduces to the problem of how 
to define "abstract labour" which constitutes the substance of value. We find four 
different elements provided by Marx to define "Abstract labour", we will introduce and 
analyse each of these definitions:  
                                                                                                                                        
(which doesn't create surplus-value), so the rate of profit obtained proportionaly to the initial 
investment for production is decreasing. 
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1- An idealist definition: Labour in general as a concept that includes concrete labours. 
But this is a purely idealist definition just like all dogs are included in the concept of 
"dog". Consequently, this definition is not sufficient to make labour the substance of 
value. 
 
2- A physiological definition [Tucker, p.310-312]:  
« Productive activity, if we leave out of sight its special form, viz., the useful character of 
the labour, is nothing but the expenditure of human labour-power. Tailoring and 
weaving, though qualitatively different productive activities, are each a productive 
expenditure of human brains, nerves, and muscles, and in this sense are human labour. 
[…] All labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human labour power, and in 
its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates and forms the value of 
commodities.  » 
 Abstract labour is here reduced to an expenditure of energy. But why then only 
consider human labour? Also, how can we account for the difference between skilled and 
unskilled labour? 
 
3- While analyzing American capitalism, Marx shows that a real homogenization of labour 
happens through dequalification [Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, 1857]:  
« This state of affairs is most pronounced in the United States, the most modern form of 
bourgeois society.  The abstract category "labor", "labor as such", labor sans phrase, the 
point of departure in modern economics, thus becomes a practical fact only there. »  
But a problem arises with this definition since here skilled labour cannot be abstract 
labour; in fact Marx abolishes here the distinction between concrete and abstract labour. 
 
4- Another interpretation of Marx is that "abstract labour" is a purely social reality. A lot 
of passages in Marx correspond to this interpretation, for example [Tucker, p. 313]:  
« The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their 
substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition. Turn and examine a single 
commodity, by itself, as we will, yet in so far as it remains an object of value, it seems 
impossible to grasp it. If, however, we bear in mind that the value of commodities has a 
purely social reality, and that they acquire this reality only in so far as they are 
expressions or embodiments of one identical social substance, viz., human labour, it 
follows as a matter of course, that value can only manifest itself in the social relation of 
commodity to commodity.» 
 This definition seems the most solid one. Nevertheless, if the magnitude of value 
is measured only through its social validation, serious problems then arise in terms of 
compatibility with an analysis in terms of "natural prices". This will be shown by exploring 
the next approach used by Marx. 
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- Articulation of the economic concepts in the "natural price" approach 
 Before analysing the "social approach", let's remember that natural prices provide 
Marx with the necessary tools to give an "objective" definition of exploitation and to 
explain the self-destruction of the capitalist process through the falling rate of profit. We 
must underline that, in such an approach, abstract labour is embodied in commodities 
and determines the magnitude of its value. Also, the value of money corresponds to the 
abstract labour embodied in it as it is for any other commodity. Thus we get the following 
chain of causality in terms of determination7: 
 
Abstract Labour              Value             Money 
 
 If this line of argument is dominant in Marx's economic writings, it is not the only 
one, it is even not a necessary one. As he writes to Kugelmann [London, July 11, 1868]: 
« even if there were no chapter on "value" in my book, the analysis of the real 
relationships which I give would contain the proof and demonstration of the real value 
relation. The nonsense about the necessity of proving the concept of value arises from 
complete ignorance both of the subject dealt with and of the method of science. Every 
child knows that a country which ceased to work, I will not say for a year, but for a few 
weeks, would die. Every child knows, too, that the mass of products corresponding to the 
different needs require different and quantitatively determined masses of the total labour 
of society. That this necessity of distributing social labour in definite proportions cannot 
be done away with the particular form of social production, but can only change the form 
it assumes, is self-evident. No natural law can be done away with. What can change, in 
changing historical circumstances, is the form in which these laws operate. And the form 
in which this proportional division of labour operates, in a state of society where the 
interconnection of social labour is manifested in the private exchange of the individual 
products of labour, is precisely the exchange value of these products. » 
 
  That brings us to Marx's social analysis of value. 
 
- Value as a social phenomenon 
 In his economic writings, Marx intended not only to demonstrate the logical 
development/collapse of capitalism, he intended also to show that the specific logic of 
capital must be put in historical prospect, by comparing it to non-capitalist societies. This 
approach is found among other places in Capital while discussing the fetishism of 
commodities [Tucker, pp. 324-328]. Marx contrasts four types of societies with the 
capitalist society:  1-Robinson on his island  2- the middle ages "shrouded in darkness" 
3- the agricultural-patriarchal society (where labour is common) 4- the communist 
society. For Marx, in those societies, social relations can be observed directly, there is a 
                                            
7 Note that in the marxist litterature, this point of view dominated for a long time. Still today, a lot of 
traditional marxists use exclusively this approach. Sraffian marxists work within this approach but 
they replace value as embodied labour by prices of production and they consider that value is not 
necessary to explain profit and exploitation [De Vroey, 1985]. 
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transparency in social relations since the products of labour are not clothed with value-
form (they are not commodities).  
 For Marx, the "natural form" of labour, is its social form. In those societies, labour 
is "immediately" social. The distinction with capitalist societies is that labour is not 
immediately social, it has to become so. Indeed, in the capitalist society, labour is 
performed privately and  the products of labour have to be exchanged in the social 
division of labour. Private labour becomes social through a social sanction, a social 
validation. This social validation of the products of private labour, for it to become 
abstract labour, is the salto mortale (somersault) of the commodity [Capital, Book I, 
Chap.3]. The magnitude of value of the commodity, that is the magnitude of abstract 
labour, depends entirely upon its social validation. [Note that this conception of abstract 
labour as a social entity corresponds exactly to the fourth definition we gave of abstract 
labour.]  And this social validation is possible only through exchange, by confronting the 
commodity with other commodities, by bringing it to the market. Social validation thus 
happens through the confrontation of the commodity with the universal commodity: 
money. Social relations thus become relations between things, between the products of 
labour. In this type of social relations, money takes a predominant role as the universal 
tool of social validation, it becomes the general other.  The value from the body of the 
commodity thus takes a leap into the body of gold and the basic social relations between 
individuals, the determination of value by the social validation of private labour, becomes 
a relation between things. Money is thus the only way to express value; the price you 
can get for a commodity is thus the expression of its value. We can synthesize the basic 
features of this approach as follow: 
1- The particular capitalist mode of production rests on generalized exchange. Labour is 
first private but we produce use-value for others (and value for ourselves). The social 
unity between producers rests on the market (which reminds producers of their 
interdependence). Note that the social division of labour corresponds in Marx to a definite 
structure of social needs (just like in Hegel where society is a system of needs [Hegel, 
pp.227-239]). 
2- Social validation demands the transformation of the products of private labour into 
commodities. Abstract labour is thus socially validated labour. Note that it just doesn't 
make sense anymore to consider that abstract labour is the substance of value, since 
abstract labour doesn't measure anything anymore.  
3- Value is purely social (society measures value). The measure and determination of 
value requires resorting to the general other, that is money.  
4- Only money and exchange can provide the social validation for the different private 
labours. 
 
 
- Articulation of the economic concepts in the social approach 
 If we contrast this social approach with the approach in terms of natural prices, 
we see that this approach negates entirely the other for at least five reasons: 
1-The value of money is not determined by abstract labour, money (or price) determines 
the value of abstract labour. 
Money              Value             Abstract Labour 
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2- The Market, as the system of social needs, becomes the ultimate judge of the 
magnitude of value (we do not find natural prices independent of market prices) 
3- Since money determines and measures value (price is the expression of value), the 
problem of the transformation of values in prices disappears, there is nothing to 
transform anymore. 
4- The specific difference of capitalism is not the value-substance, but generalized 
exchange. (The idea of embodied labour doesn't make sense anymore since the 
magnitude of value is not determined in production but in exchange). 
5-Since money measures value, it cannot measure itself. Money thus cannot be a value, 
it cannot be a commodity, it is only a measure, a convention as in Aristotle. So all the 
weak thesis by Marx about the regulation of money through hoarding are not necessary 
anymore. Also, credit money doesn't have to be reduced to commodities anymore. 
 
 The antagonism between the logical analysis of natural prices and the social 
analysis are evident in Marx' works. Marx himself stressed the fundamental weakness in 
his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy [translated from Marx, 1965, Tome 
1, p.298]: 
"On the one hand, commodities must enter the exchange process as materialised 
universal labour-time, on the other hand, the labour-time of individuals becomes 
materialised universal labour-time only as the result of the exchange process." 
 
 Abstract social labour being simultaneously the condition and the outcome of 
exchange; Marx's theory is thus trapped in a logical contradiction. Indeed, if the market 
is the social process by which values come to existence and are determined, values 
cannot logically pre-exist to market. As explains Benetti [1999, p.125], we can better 
understand why it will be necessary for Marx, in order to avoid this difficulty, to abandon 
progressively the principle of unity of production and circulation (unity between the 
natural price approach and the social approach), to resort more and more to the 
Ricardian affirmation of primacy of production over circulation (primacy of the natural 
price approach).  
 The clear identification of this contradiction disappears in Capital, but Marx's 
struggle to merge those two conceptions into one theory is obvious if we look at the 
different versions of the first chapter of Capital [in Dognin, 1977]. We find in the actual 
(fourth) edition of Capital the following passage [Tucker, p.322]: "when we bring the 
products of our labor into relation with each other as values, it is not because we see in 
these articles the material receptacles of homogeneous human labor. Quite the contrary: 
whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, 
we also equate, as human labor, the different kinds of labor expended upon them" (C., I, 
p. 74). In the first edition of Capital, this passage had precisely the opposite meaning. In 
Marx's original work, this passage said: "People relate their products to each other as 
values to the extent that these things are for them only material shells of homogeneous 
human labor," etc. (Capital, 1, 1867, cited in Rubin, p.148) Marx also corrected the later 
text for the French edition of 1875 (which had for Marx its own specific scientific value). 
In the actual edition of Capital we find: "The equalization of the most different kinds of 
labor can be the result only of an abstraction from their inequalities, or of reducing them 
  
NOTES DE CONFÉRENCES – DÉCEMBRE 2006 
Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Mondialisation, Citoyenneté et Démocratie 
http://www.chaire-mcd.ca/ 
 
to their common denominator, viz., expenditure of human labor-power or human labor in 
the abstract." [Tucker, p.322].  In the French edition, at the end of this sentence, Marx 
replaced the period with a comma and added: "and only exchange brings about this 
reduction, opposing the products of different forms of labor with each other on the basis 
of equality" [French edition of Capital, 1875].  
 Marx is clearly trapped in the logical contradiction caused by the different 
articulation of the economic concepts in the two approaches. Any attempt to reconcile 
those propositions must confront the different logical problems identified above in terms 
of articulation of economic concepts. 
 
CONCLUSION: RECONSIDERING MARX'S CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE 
 At the beginning of this paper, we introduced Marx's comment about Aristotle. 
Marx considers Aristotle economic analysis of exchange value to be a failure since he 
does not identify the substance of value. But Aristotle wasn't able to achieve such 
identification since it is necessary to consider men equals, a preconception alien to 
ancient Greek society. We will have to wait for the rise of the market society and for the 
apparition of the capitalist economy to finally identify the common substance of all things 
with human labour. 
 We showed how Marx's reconstruction of a true economic analysis, ridden of 
bourgeois ideology, is in fact still grounded in the moral conceptions embedded in the 
Ricardian tradition and that it also leads to important theoretical problems. But another 
problem arises when we analyze more closely Marx's comment on Aristotle: how should 
we interpret the passage from the heterogeneity of goods to the homogeneity of 
commodities in history. The question of the determination of exchange value is the 
question of how can we equalize two different goods, how can qualitative differences can 
be reduced to a quantitative difference, how can the Other be reduced to One? For Marx, 
the capitalist economy is characterized by a homogenization through a determination of 
value substance, socially necessary labour-time. But is this specific to the capitalist 
economy or is it simply an illusion of the capitalist economy that we can reduce 
everything to a quantitative difference. The comment on Aristotle implies that value as 
socially necessary labour-time always existed and is a basic truth for all societies. As 
Castoriadis indicates [1978, pp.347-350] Marx in fact oscillates between three 
interpretations of the homogenization of goods: 
1-The capitalist economy finally makes apparent something that always was there, 
hidden. Men (and their labour) were equals from the beginning but this 
essential/substantial equality was veiled by "fantastic" and archaic representations. This 
is how we must understand Marx's comment on Aristotle. 
2- The capitalist economy does transform in reality, and for the first time in history, 
heterogeneous men and labour into a homogeneous and measurable substance, abstract 
labour. For the first time, this homogeneity comes to existence. This conception is the 
one prevailing in the Grundrisse.  
3- The capitalist economy gives the appearance of homogeneity to things that are 
essentially heterogeneous (men and their labour). The appearance of equality exists 
because labour is used as a common measure through commodification of labour-power, 
but it is in fact a bourgeois conception of equality since a common measure for 
individuals that are different is a source of inequality. In a communist society ridden of 
the bourgeois conception of equality, no common measure must be used to attain real 
equality; each man must be able to determine his own capacities and his own needs, 
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each man measures his needs and capacities, each man is his own standard of 
measurement: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" 
[Tucker, 1978, p.531]. This interpretation is found in the Critique of the Gotha Program. 
 
 Marx's critique of Aristotle thus becomes very blurry. According to the three 
interpretations above, why was Aristotle unable to see the common measure of goods in 
equality in human labour?  
1-Because it was hidden. Labour was homogeneous but the archaic social preconceptions 
refrained him to see the real nature of men as equals (because of the absence of the 
prejudice of equality).  
2-Because there was nothing to see. This ontological equality among men didn't exist yet 
and we will have to wait until the apparition of the capitalist economy for this 
homogenization in human labour to come to existence. 
3-Because there is no point for an Ancient Greek to speculate on the possible 
phantasmagorias and illusions that will prevail in future societies. Labour is 
heterogeneous, it always was and it will always be, whatever illusion creates a capitalist 
economy. Aristotle was right all along. 
  
 By comparing and contrasting the Aristotelician and Ricardian traditions to 
establish a system to equalize goods, we showed that one evaluated exchange value 
from a social convention while the other considered the determination of exchange value 
to be the product of a quantum of value, that is human labour and that the respect of 
this determination is achieved through natural forces at work in the free competitive 
market. Conceptions of justice and power prevail in both traditions.  
 Nevertheless, defending that goods have a certain exchange value according to 
their Value, that is because of the quantum of human labour contained in it, or defending 
that goods have a certain exchange value because of a proportionality established among 
men by convention, we fall back not on the objects, but on the human activity that 
makes them come into being. But, as explains Castoriadis [1978, p.386], if we consider 
that this equalization in the products of human activity is based on a conventional 
proportionality established among men, it is difficult not to question the foundation of 
this proportionality and it is impossible to forget that it is first and foremost a social 
institution. But, if we consider that exchange value is determined by a quantum of a 
substance (value) of homogeneous labour, it is easy to fall in the illusion of naturalization 
of this substance, as did the classical political economists. The same can be said for Marx 
since he tended to fall back in logic of natural prices. Also, in his comment on Aristotle, 
Marx naturalizes Value as a transhistoric truth. Here, it is the author of Capital, and not 
the author of Metaphysics, that becomes the metaphysician. 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Aristote, Les Économiques, Paris, Vrin, 1993. 
  
NOTES DE CONFÉRENCES – DÉCEMBRE 2006 
Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Mondialisation, Citoyenneté et Démocratie 
http://www.chaire-mcd.ca/ 
 
Aristotle, Politics, translation by Benjamin Jovett, internet edition. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W. D. Ross. 
Carlo Benetti, "Mercato e divisione del lavoro: Una riformulazione critica della teoria di 
Marx", Rivista di Politica Economica, 89 (4-5), April-May, 1999.  
Alain Béraud & Gilbert Faccarello (dir.), Nouvelle histoire de la pensée économique (Tome 
1: des Scolastiques aux Classiques), Paris, La Découverte, 1992. 
Alain Béraud & Gilbert Faccarello (dir.), Nouvelle histoire de la pensée économique (Tome 
2: des premiers mouvements socialistes aux néoclassiques), Paris, La Découverte, 2000. 
Cornelius Castoriadis, "Valeur, égalité, justice, politique; de Marx à Aristote et d'Aristote 
à nous", in Les carrefours du labyrinthe, Paris, Seuil, 1978, pp.325-413. 
Paul-Dominique Dognin, Les sentiers escarpés de Karl Marx; Le chapitre 1 du "Capital" 
traduit et commenté dans trois rédactions successives, Paris, Cerf, 1977. 
Gilles Dostaler, Valeur et Prix; histoire d'un débat, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 
1978. 
Gilbert Faccarello, Travail, Valeur et Prix: Une critique de la théorie  de la  valeur, 
Anthropos, Paris, 1983. 
Gilbert Faccarello, "Marx et la critique de l'économie politique: «le purgatoire du temps 
présent», in Faccarello & Béraud (dir), 2000, pp.62-170. 
Gilbert Faccarello, "Les controverses autour du Capital (I); Les débats autour de la loi de 
la valeur", in Faccarello & Béraud, 2000, pp. 171-201. 
Friedrich Hayek, La présomption fatale (The Fatal Conceit), Paris, PUF, 1988. 
Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the philosophy of right, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
Rudolf Hilferding, Le capital financier, Éditions de Minuit, Paris, 1970. 
Thomas Hobbes [1652], Leviathan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Odd Langholm, Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought; Antecedents of Choice and 
Power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
André Lapidus, Le détour de valeur, Paris, Économica, 1986. 
Juan de Lugo, De iusticia et iure, Lyon, 1646. 
Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. 
Gérard Jorland, Les paradoxes du capital, Éditions  Odile Jacob, Paris, 1995. 
Karl Marx, Letters to Dr. Kugelmann, Cooperative publishing society of foreign workers in 
the USSR, Moscow, 1934. 
Karl Marx, Théories sur la Plus-Value (3 vol.), Éditions Sociales, Paris, 1974-1976. 
Karl Marx, Œuvres; Économie (1&2), Gallimard, Paris, 1965. 
David Ricardo (3rd edition, 1821), On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxations, 
Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001. 
  
NOTES DE CONFÉRENCES – DÉCEMBRE 2006 
Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Mondialisation, Citoyenneté et Démocratie 
http://www.chaire-mcd.ca/ 
 
Isaac Illich Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1973. 
Adam Smith [1759], The Theory of moral Sentiments, Indiannapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984. 
Adam Smith [1776], The Wealth of Nations, Everyman's Library/Knopf, New 
York/Toronto 1991.  
Ramon Tortajada, "La Renaissance de la Scolastique; La Réforme et les théories du droit 
naturel", in Faccarello & Béraud, 1992, pp.71-94. 
Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader, WW Norton & cie, London/New York, 
1978. 
Michel de Vroey, "La théorie marxiste de la valeur, version travail abstrait; un bilan 
critique", in Dostaler, Gilles (dir.), Un échiquier centenaire; Théorie de la valeur et 
formation des  prix, Presses de l'université du Québec, 1985, pp. 31-58. 
 
 
 
*** 
 
 
NOTE IMPORTANTE 
Si vous désirez citer ce document, nous vous prions de bien vouloir 
utiliser la référence complète dans le format suivant : 
Gagnon, Marc-André. 17 février 2006. «Measuring Exchange-Value; 
Evaluation of the Ricardian and Aristotelician Traditions». Conférences 
de la Chaire MCD. En ligne. <http://www.chaire-cd.ca>. 
 
Les idées exprimées dans ce document n’engagent que l’auteur. Elles ne 
traduisent en aucune manière une position officielle de la Chaire de 
recherche du Canada en Mondialisation, Citoyenneté et Démocratie.  
 
